The Reinvention of the Far Right in Postmodernity.

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Does the surprising resurgence of the far right and its inherent territorialization lie within its very opposite—the individualistic postmodern era, itself a product of universal emancipatory modernity? This is a striking paradox that must be analyzed beyond mere emotion.

It is curious to observe the proliferation of far-right parties in "modern democratic" societies that seemed to have significantly curtailed the extremes—on the left, communism and authoritarian socialism; and on the right, fascism. This is a fundamental ambition for them. While the far left has weakened considerably, we are seeing a resurgence of far-right movements. How is this possible? It should be noted that one characteristic of this political movement is not yet apparent—at least not yet: nationalism, the glorification of the homeland as a superior form, which would have placed it in stark contradiction with liberal democracy. For it is within modernity itself that it has emerged. How does a liberal movement produce such a reversal of its own nature? An important concrete characteristic: at the helm of major European far-right parties are women. An extraordinary reversal: traditionally, women have been relegated to the domestic sphere—and certainly not placed at the head of these parties. This focus on the fatherland by the early far right is often viewed by new adherents as a leftist stance; thus, the herd mentality of Nazism allows some to dismiss it as belonging to the other side—the "socialism" of National Socialism, the "socialism" of early Mussolini—thereby evading responsibility for their crimes. It should be noted that these women do not even adhere in their personal lives to the moral standards championed by the conformist parties of the traditional right. Melloni has never been married and has had several separations; Marine Le Pen has had three divorces and is currently single; the president of the German AfD is a lesbian with an Asian partner and three adopted children, and some of the party's leaders are openly gay. In this way, they defy the movement's original fundamental tenets.

For if belonging to a Western country or camp emerges at all, it is based on postmodern liberal mores—and even those of the post-1968 era. The West is the land of liberalism, in both mores and ideas; therein lies its supposed superiority. Liberalism toward foreigners—where every identity is considered honorable—is turned on its head: group cohesion does not rest on a theoretically justified and explicitly asserted racial superiority, but on the idea that they are, at the very least, "not like us"—unable to integrate even after several generations because they come from fundamentally "archaic" countries and religions. The rejection of violence against women and of legally subjugating them—in the tradition of the radical right—cements this far-right movement, whose anger is directed against Islam, Muslims, and Arabs, to put it briefly and at the certain risk of oversimplification. While modernity claimed to be based on utopian and egalitarian revolutionary ideas, the liberal and individualistic postmodern ideology—the logical culmination of modernity—allows the "king-individual" to coalesce anew around ethnic and religious differences. This is a truly astonishing reversal.

And a political-ideological typology of postmodernism remains to be established. Indeed, the main points of the political-ideological spectrum do not disappear but are arranged around a designated center, namely postmodern individualism in our time—without prejudging future developments—along with a paradigm shift, as suggested in this presentation and as revealed by historical study.